So far, the claim that early agreements would reduce the time to deliberate and negotiate has not been systematically tested. To assess the seriousness of this part of the criticism of early agreements, Dimiter Toshkov and I examined whether early agreements are reached more quickly than other agreements and whether there is a long-term model for different types of agreements, depending on the importance and controversy of legislative files. Much remains to be done to systematically examine the consequences of early agreements. However, on the basis of the results of our analysis, it seems clear that the EP has adapted to the evolution of the codecision procedure and that these adaptations seem to have contributed to a more in-depth examination of the accelerated legislation. Our results show that even if the acceleration of legislation limits the access of certain actors to decision-making, exceptional legislative agreements at an early stage leave more time for substantive debates and negotiations at first reading. Therefore, if we compare the duration of the first readings of important dossiers that ended here and later in the legislative procedure, we see that the first readings on the first group of dossiers take longer. This indicates that the co-legislators compensate for some of the time lost resulting from the non-entry into second reading by extending the duration of the negotiations at first reading if the agreements differ. In this way, the number of initiatives taken by the EP to formalise, clarify and institutionalise the procedures for setting up early agreements seems to have borne fruit.